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Abstract.Parental demand for academic performance is a key element in the
view that strengthening school choice will drive up school performance. In
this paper we analyse what parents look for in choosing schools. We assemble
a unique dataset combining survey information on parents choices plus a rich
set of socio-economic characteristics; administrative data on school charac-
teristics, admissions criteria and allocation rules; and spatial data attached to
a pupil census to define the de facto set of schools available to each family in
the survey. To achieve identification, we focus on cities where the school place
allocation system is truth-revealing (equal preferences). We take great care in
trying to capture the set of schools that each family could realistically choose
from. We also look at a large subset of parents who continued living in the
same house as before the child was born, to avoid endogenous house/school
moves. We then model the choices made in terms of the characteristics of
schools and families and the distances involved. School characteristics in-
clude measures of academic performance, school socio-economic and ethnic
composition, and its faith school status. Initial results showed strong dif-
ferences in the set of choices available to parents in different socio-economic
positions. Our central analysis uses multinomial logistic regression to show
that families do indeed value academic performance in schools. They also
value school composition preferring schools with low fractions of children
from poor families. We compute trade-offs between these characteristics as
well as between these and distance travelled. We are able to compare these
trade-offs for different families. Our results suggest that preferences do not
vary greatly between different socio-economic groups once constraints are
fully accounted for.
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Strong parental demand for academic performance is a key element in the view that 
strengthening school choice will drive up school performance. Since school choice is a 
widely endorsed school improvement policy, this assumption is an important policy issue too, 
and the academic and policy debates on “school choice” are both controversial and 
unresolved. In this paper, we contribute to this debate by offering new evidence on the nature 
and heterogeneity of school preferences. We address two key questions. First, what 
characteristics are families actually looking for in a school? Is the school’s academic 
attainment record important, or do other factors out-weigh it?  Second, do preferences differ 
between families in important ways, for example by socio-economic status? The former 
question is important for the idea that strengthening choice will raise standards. The latter 
question is potentially part of the answer to an important fact about schooling in England. In 
England, children from poor families are much more likely to go to academically low-scoring 
schools1. This allocation could arise through differences in preferences or in constraints. It is 
sometimes argued that poorer families care most about proximity of home to school, whilst 
middle class families care most about school quality2. If so, this might be a substantial 
contributing factor to the quality differential. The difficulty of disentangling constraints from 
preferences makes this a difficult question to address, however.  
 
In this paper we assemble a unique dataset that allows us to address these questions. We use 
survey information on parents’ school choices plus a rich set of socio-economic and 
neighbourhood characteristics. We have administrative data on school characteristics, 
admissions criteria and allocation rules. Finally, and crucially for identification, we have the 
national pupil census, with embedded spatial information which allows us to model de facto 
catchment areas around schools. The model set-up involves parents nominating a school as 
their first choice on the appropriate form. The ingredients of this process are: a set of schools 
that the parents choose from; information on the characteristics of those schools; parents’ 
preferences over those characteristics; and an allocation mechanism that maps from the 
parents’ nomination to actual school attended. There are two central identification challenges 
                                                
1 See Burgess and Briggs (2009). 
2 Hastings et al (2005); Hastings et al (2006). Also see our companion paper Burgess et al (2009) with 
descriptive evidence of the difference in stated preferences from high and low socio-economic status parents.  
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in this: defining the de facto set of schools that a family can actually choose from; and 
determining how the school nominated by the family relates to their true preferences as a 
function of the allocation mechanism. These two inter-relate in that getting the first right is 
helpful in addressing the second. The first question is a major data exercise and is dealt with 
in detail in the Data section. Combining the pupil census and the spatial information, we 
define for each child in the survey dataset a minimal set of schools for which they have 
almost-sure access. The second issue relies on the mechanism design literature that has 
analysed agents’ optimal responses to assignment mechanisms. Parents’ nominations for 
school choice will be affected by the admission criteria (or the mechanism design) used by 
schools. At the relevant date for our survey, about two-thirds of Local Authorities in England 
used a mechanism likely to elicit truthful preferences among almost-sure schools (Coldron et 
al, 2006). We implement a conditional logit model to estimate families’ revealed preferences. 
Given these empirical feasible choice sets, the truth-revealing assignment mechanism and the 
widespread availability of school information in England, we make inferences about parental 
preferences from the observed choice of school. 
 
Our results show that the three main factors that families care about are academic attainment, 
school socio-economic composition and travel distance. We estimate average trade-offs 
between these to be as follows: for a school that is about 400m further away3, families would 
on average need an increase of 11 percentage points in the academic attainment measure to 
be indifferent, about 1 standard deviation. Similarly, again for a school about 400m further 
away, families would indifferent to nominating that school if its fraction of poor students was 
7 percentage points lower, about half a standard deviation. We can also compute the 
preference trade-off directly between academic attainment and school composition. A 1 
percentage point increase in the proportion of poor students at a school is off-set by a 1.722 
percentage point increase in the attainment measure. So a school with a high intake of poor 
children can still be attractive to parents if it performs very well academically. Given that on 
average poor children tend to under-perform relative to their better-off peers, however, the 
school’s educational quality has to be considerably higher to more than offset this initial 
detriment.  
 
Turing to the second question, our econometric model produces potentially different trade-off 
values for each respondent, and indeed we would not expect families to have exactly the 
                                                
3 This is about two-thirds of the mean distance between home to nearest primary school in England. 
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same preferences. We show that the distribution of trade-off values mostly overlap for the 
highest socio-economic quintile and the lowest, however. That is, we find no evidence of 
importantly different preferences among rich and poor. This suggests that inequality in access 
to good schools is primarily due to constraints.  
 
These results add to the live academic debate around school choice. Recent reviews of the 
evidence include Howell and Peterson (2002), Hoxby (2003a) and Ladd (2003). Whilst there 
has been a great deal of work on the impact of school choice, investigating preferences 
directly is less common. Closest to this paper, Hastings, Kane and Staiger (2005) estimate a 
mixed-logit demand model for schools using school choice data from North Carolina. They 
find that parents value proximity highly and that the preference attached to a school's mean 
test score increases with student's income and own academic ability. Hastings et al use their 
model to estimate the elasticity of demand for each school with respect to mean test scores in 
the school. They find that demand at high-performing schools is more responsive to increases 
in mean test scores than demand at low performing schools. Jacob and Lefgren (2007) 
analyse families’ revealed preference for teachers within schools by looking at transfer 
requests made to the school. They find that for those in low-income schools where academic 
inputs are presumably scarce, motivated parents choose teachers based on their perceived 
ability to improve academic achievement. In contrast, in higher-income schools “parents 
seem to respond to the relative abundance of academic inputs by seeking out teachers who 
also increase student satisfaction”. Rothstein (2006) adopts a more indirect approach to 
evaluate the relative weight parents place on school effectiveness and peer group attributes. 
He finds little evidence that parents focus strongly on school effectiveness.   Other authors 
have focussed on the availability or intelligibility of the information given to parents, which 
may influence the choices of parents from different social groups (Hastings, Weeldon, 
Weinstein (2007); Ball, Bowe and Gewitz (1996)). A number of educational and sociological 
studies have explored the process of parental choice in detail, often focusing on parents’ 
stated preferences for schools (see our companion paper, Burgess et al (2009)).  
 
In the next section we present our modelling framework and describe the systems by which 
children are allocated to schools in England. We also set out the econometric model we 
adopt. Section 3 details the data, focussing in particular on the definition and estimation of 
the feasible choice sets. Section 4 presents the results, first describing the properties of these 
choice sets, then the central preference model, robustness checks and the interpretation of the 
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results. Finally, we offer some conclusions for school choice and for educational inequality in 
section 5.  
 
2. Model 
 
We set out the broad economic approach, the identification issue and our econometric model.  
 
a. Economic model 
 
Our variable of interest is the school that parents nominate as their first choice on the 
appropriate application form. This nomination process involves: a set of schools that the 
parents choose from; information on the characteristics of those schools; parents’ preferences 
over those characteristics; and an allocation mechanism that maps from the parents’ 
nomination to actual school attended. Our approach is to make assumptions about the 
information parents have; to precisely and carefully define the set of schools that parents can 
choose from, and then given that and the known allocation mechanism, to make inferences 
about parents’ preferences from the choice of school we observe. We will discuss these 
assumptions in turn. 
 
We assume that parents prefer the school that maximises their utility. We follow an additive 
random utility framework in which we assume the classical model of the rational, utility 
maximising consumer (McFadden, 1977). The parent faces a choice of schools indexed s = 
1,…, n. Each parent i derives utility  from each school s, which may in general depend on 
characteristics of the parent, pupil and school. This is standard, and for each individual i is 
written , where s is the number of schools ranging from .  denotes 
the deterministic component of utility and  denotes the random component. Deterministic 
components include parent and school characteristics, and may be written as follows: 
 
    (1) 
 
Where  represents the characteristics of the schools (varying by alternative school) and  
represent the invariant characteristics of the parent and child. Random components  
include idiosyncratic tastes of the parent and unobserved characteristics of the choices, such 
as school ethos or leadership. Probabilistic statements about the distribution of choices can be 
made, where parent i nominates the school that maximises her utility. The probability that 
school s is parent i’s most preferred school is: 
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    (2) 
 
This favourite school will not necessarily be the one that parents actually nominate as the first 
choice on the form however, as the optimal nomination decision also depends on the 
assignment mechanism. We therefore describe the school assignment system in England 
before we examine identification of parents’ preferences.  
 
b. The school admissions system in England 
 
In the UK, the term ‘school choice’ describes parents’ right to express a preference for the 
school they would most like their child to attend. Parents must complete a common 
application form to their Local Authority (LA), on which they may nominate at least three 
schools4. The LA then assigns pupils to schools based on these nominations, school 
admission criteria and the availability of places; parents’ preferences may not necessarily 
translate into a place at their desired school, and school admission criteria play an important 
role.  
 
Within an LA, there are various types of school, some of which follow the admission criteria 
set by the LA, some of which set their own admissions criteria subject to legislatively binding 
restrictions on the types of criteria that may be applied by schools. Admissions to community 
schools are decided by the LA according to a set of rules and an assignment mechanism, 
which will be discussed shortly. Community schools make up the significant majority of 
primary schools in most areas (62% over England as a whole), but there are other types of 
school which are semi-autonomous for which the governing body sets the admissions criteria. 
These are Voluntary Aided (VA) schools (mainly faith schools which make up 21% of 
primary schools in England), and Foundation schools, which make up 2% of primary schools 
in England. 
 
Voluntary Controlled (VC) schools (which make up 14.5% of primary schools in England) 
are essentially Community schools that may have a faith orientation. Admission criteria for 
VC schools are determined by the LA. Parents apply to VA, VC and Foundation schools 
through the common application form also used for regular Community schools. Pupils 
wishing to apply to a VA school may complete a separate form for the school in addition to 
the LA form. The Schools Admission Code of 2007 set strict guidelines for what may be 
included as additional admissions criteria by schools, ensuring “fair” access for all. The code 
applies to all types of school, whether the admissions authority is the LA or the governing 
                                                
4 Not all parents will give three preferences for school choice. Some LAs invite up to six preferences for school 
choice, although the mode is 3. 
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body. In 2004, however, when our cohort made their application covert selection by schools 
was still possible, for example requiring photographs or personal statements from applicants. 
In a survey of admissions criteria, West et al (2003) find that 27% of voluntary-aided schools 
interviewed parents as part of the admissions process. This allows “cream skimming” of 
pupils by schools, which affects the mechanism under which parents make their choices. In 
the majority of cases, VA schools require proof of religiosity and priestly support, again 
potentially subjective criteria that may be used to cream skim particular types of students. 
 
For non-autonomous schools (the majority), first priority in admission is given to a series of 
special groups: children with a statement of special educational need; children who are 
looked-after by the local authority; and children with siblings who already attend the school. 
After these pupils, those living closest to the school are generally given priority. The system 
is rather different to the US in that it is less discrete. Admission is generally not based on 
within-district vs outside-district criteria, but based more on continuous measures such as 
degree of proximity and straight line distance5.  
 
Approximately 95%6 of all primary school age pupils in England attend state funded primary 
schools, so we focus only on these pupils; we discuss the empirical aspects of this further in 
the Data section.  
 
c. Identification 
 
There are two central identification issues. The first is defining the set of schools that a 
family can actually choose from. The second is determining how the school nominated by the 
family relates to their true preferences.  The first issue is a major data exercise and is dealt 
with in detail in the Data section.  
 
The mechanism design literature that has analysed agents’ optimal responses to assignment 
mechanisms informs the second issue. Parents’ nominations for school choice will be 
affected by the admission criteria (or the mechanism design) used by schools and LAs in their 
area. Recent literature has analysed agents’ optimal responses to assignment mechanisms in 
many contexts where agents on two sides of a market need to be paired up7. In the school 
choice context Abdulkadiroğlu and Sӧmnez (2003) set out the mechanism design approach to 
                                                
5 In some rural areas there are sometimes de facto catchment areas i.e. a village. Village A would be linked to a 
particular primary school located in a neighbouring village or town. So children living in village A would have 
priority over other potential applicants who lived nearer but not in the catchment area. 
 
6 From the authors own calculations, based on the Independent Schools Council Census 2009 
http://www.isc.co.uk/publication_8_0_0_11_561.htm, and the Annual Schools Census for Spring 2008. 
7 For example, labour markets as in Roth (1991). 
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school assignment, Abdulkadiroğlu et al (2005a, b) apply this approach to the Boston and 
NYC school districts, and Pathak and Sӧmnez (2008) and Abdulkadiroğlu et al (2008) 
subsequently update the design. These papers determine the properties of particular 
assignment mechanisms and whether they elicit true preferences from the participants.  
 
Revealing true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy in two common mechanisms known 
as “Student Optimal Stable Matching” (or “Student Proposing Deferred Acceptance”) and 
“Top Trading Cycles”. These mechanisms have other properties, not of issue here.  
 
In the year that our sample made their decision, (Autumn 2004 for entry in September 2005) 
there were two different assignment mechanisms in use in England. LAs could either operate 
a ‘first preference first’ system in which schools give priority to those that named the school 
as their first choice on the application form, or an ‘equal preference’ system in which the rank 
assigned to the school is not taken into account. The equal preference (EP) system is broadly 
equivalent to the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, first proposed by Gale and 
Shapley (1962). In both, pupils rank schools; the admissions authority or school decides 
which pupils to admit without reference to the parents’ rank of the school. Details of the EP 
system are given in Pennell, West and Hind (2006). Thus we argue that the EP mechanism 
encourages families to reveal their true preferences.  
 
The difference between the EP and student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is that 
under EP parents can rank only a limited number of schools. Coldron et al (2006) report that 
“most LAs (95, 64%) invited 3 preferences, some invited 4 or 5 preferences (12, 8%) whilst a 
notable number invited 6 or 7 preferences (41, 28%).” It is therefore possible that a pupil will 
not be admitted to any of these schools, encouraging at least one “safe” choice and perhaps 
strategic nominations. Haeringer and Klijn (2008) and Calsamiglia et al (2009) show that 
when parents can make only limited nominations, truth-telling is not optimal in some 
circumstances and for some players. We believe our definition of a feasible set of schools 
avoids this problem, however. Calsamiglia et al (2009) show that in a game with k choices on 
the form, playing truthfully up to and including the “safe” school is weakly dominant for 
those families with a school with certain entry in the top k (Calsamiglia et al 2009, pp. 9 – 
10). See also Abdulkadiroglu et al (2008), discussed below. As our preferred definition of 
each family’s feasible choice set only includes schools to which entry is almost certain we 
overcome the problem of limited choices. 
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In contrast to the EP system, the first preference first system (FPF) encourages expression of 
‘safe’ choices; parents whose true preference is a very over-subscribed school are unlikely to 
name it as their first nominated school as they risk losing entry to the schools nominated as 
their second or third choice as well. Through a survey of LAs’ admissions criteria for the 
entry year 2006/2007, Coldron et al (2006) find that in 2006 68% of LAs used an EP system, 
the remainder using FPF8.  
 
In order to ensure that our results provide informative and valid evidence for families’ true 
school preferences we employ three main identification strategies. We also provide brief 
evidence on the extent of strategic preferences made on application forms.  First, we restrict 
our analysis to LAs which used the EP (student proposing deferred acceptance) mechanism at 
the time of our parents’ application, as parents’ nominations in these LAs should be truth-
revealing.  
 
Second, we define a truly feasible choice set of schools for all families; schools at which the 
family is almost certain to be offered a place because their very-close-neighbours already 
attend the school9. A highly desirable school that is unfeasible for some reason (perhaps 
oversubscription and a small catchment area) will therefore be excluded from the feasible 
choice set. This is detailed fully in the Data section. This addresses the problem of a 
constrained number of choices. In the student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, 
even if parents can only rank a subset of schools, if all schools are “safe” choices then they 
can do no better than ranking those schools in the correct order. This is a result in the 
appendix of Abdulkadiroglu et al (2008)10.  
 
Third, there are two subsidiary pieces of information that strengthen the case that the 
nominations are truly revealing preferences. First, parents are specifically asked if they made 
their choice strategically11; only 10% confirmed that they had. Second, parents are also asked 
if there was another school that they truly preferred to their top nominated school but that 
they did not put down on the form. Only 7% said that they had done this. In these cases we 
substitute “truly preferred” school for the nominated school.  
 
                                                
8 These relate to secondary schools, but LAs will use the same system for each. 
9 All these schools are therefore essentially equivalent to the characterisation of “district” schools in the US 
system in the mechanism design literature.  
10 The result does not necessarily imply that families will rank their top choice first, but it does mean that the 
nominations will be ordered correctly; that is, the rank order will be preserved. This is still informative about the 
weights families place on their choices. 
11 Parents were asked to give the reasons they choose to nominate their first choice school. We assume that 
parents acted strategically in their nominations if they give “how likely it was that [their child] would get a 
place” or that the “school is a feeder school” as an important reason for their choice. 
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Finally, we offer evidence to corroborate our claims on the different strategies that families 
employ by comparing first and second choices made under the two allocation mechanisms. 
For the sub-sample who report two or more choices we compare different dimensions of the 
quality of the schools by family characteristics. It is not possible to make precise claims about 
families nominating “better” or “worse” schools under the different systems. We can offer 
some informal evidence on the nature of first and second nominations under the two systems, 
however. We might typically expect a “safer” first choice under the FPF mechanism than 
under the EP mechanism.  Figure 1 provides suggestive evidence to support this. In both LA 
types, the richest families, in the 4th and 5th socio-economic status quintiles, nominate a 
higher scoring first school than second. But for the lower socio-economic quintiles (which are 
typically the ones who may need to consider strategic behaviour), the pattern reverses 
between EP and FPF, with the first nomination being lower scoring on average than the 
second in FPF LAs.  
 
d. Econometric model 
 
We estimate a multinomial model to model parents’ choice of schools. Such models enable 
us to allow simultaneously for both the characteristics of pupils and their families, and the 
characteristics of schools on the schooling decision. Following McFadden’s classic approach, 
the nature of the multinomial model generated depends on the assumption about the joint 
distribution of the error terms. The conditional logit model is obtained by assuming that the 
error terms are iid type 1 extreme value, with density:  
 
       (3) 
 
We use the conditional or ‘mixed’ logit, which is given by: 
 
    (4) 
 
where represents a vector of school characteristics that will vary across the choices (and 
between families). Variables for the characteristics of the choices have a common 
coefficient . represents a vector of characteristics of the families that are constant across 
choices, such as the respondent’s highest level of education or the  ability level of the child. 
The value of the variable is constant across school groups, but may have a different impact on 
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the probability of choosing each school group. Variables that are characteristics of the 
choosers therefore have school-specific coefficients . Relative to a multinomial logit, this 
approach allows both respondent-specific and option-specific characteristics to be included. 
In the present context, this is a crucial feature of the model. 
 
In the traditional applications of the McFadden model, the options that respondents face are 
generic; in transport studies the choice may be between travelling by “car”, “train”, or “bus” 
for example; in the occupational literature it may be the choice of profession (Schmidt et al, 
1975).  In our context choices are not generic, as respondents are geographically spread and 
do not choose between the same specific schools. The underlying choice object is a named, 
specific school, and since respondents live in different areas no respondents will face a choice 
over the same specific schools. Even within the same town two respondents may have 
different feasible schools to choose from. To implement the model, we therefore group the 
schools together into generic categories based on their attainment scores, composition and 
faith status. These school groups are common between all families. This approach has been 
used in the residential choice literature, where choices are grouped into housing “bundles” 
(Quigley, 1976). Demand for health-care provision focuses on choice of provider type, rather 
than a specific choice (Thomson et al, 2008). Categorizing schools into school groups is 
necessary for the model to allow the choice-invariant characteristics, Wi.  The grouping has 
further practical advantages as it reduces the dimensionality; some respondents in dense 
urban areas had up to 100 feasible schools within a 3km radius. Finally, grouping similar 
schools also helps avoid the problem of independence of irrelevant alternatives often found in 
conditional and multinomial logit models; the models should only be used in cases where the 
choices are assumed to be “distinct and weighed independently in the eyes of each decision 
maker”(McFadden, 1973). Details of this grouping process are provided in the Data section 
below.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Data 
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We have assembled a dataset combining survey information on parents’ choices plus a rich 
set of socio-economic characteristics; administrative data on school characteristics, 
admissions criteria and allocation rules; and spatial data attached to a pupil census to define 
the de facto set of schools available to each family in the survey. Our data sources and 
construction are described below. 
 
a. The Millennium Cohort Study 
 
Our longitudinal survey dataset is the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS). This was sampled 
from all live births in the UK, over the period from 1 September 2000 to 31 August 2001. 
This period coincides with the school academic year, so the children in the study in England 
form an academic cohort. We focus only on England in order to exploit the pupil census data 
only available for England; also there are differences in the education systems in the other 
countries of the UK. For England, the sample was selected from a random sample of electoral 
wards, disproportionately stratified to ensure adequate representation of deprived areas, 
defined as the poorest 25% of wards based on the Child Poverty Index (CPI)12, and also areas 
with high concentrations of Black and Asian families13. 
 
The MCS provides rich information on parents’ characteristics and their relationship with the 
child. Our paper mainly uses the third survey of the MCS, taken in 2006 when children in the 
study were 5 years old, although we draw on earlier waves for some parental characteristics. 
The timing of the third survey was deliberate; the children were beginning primary school 
and a main objective of the MCS was “to record the child’s transition to primary school, from 
the point of view of their parents and their school”.  
 
Details of the parent and pupil characteristics we use can be found in Appendix 1. These are 
fairly standard controls. We summarise a number of measures of income, occupation and so 
on in a single socio-economic status measure; Appendix 2 gives details of the principal 
component analysis used to construct this. As noted above, the weighted sample is 
representative of the UK at the time it was drawn, though the stratification means that our 
sample lives in disproportionately deprived areas. Note that we take the “parental faith” 
indicator from wave 1. This ensures we have a measure of parents’ faith prior to any strategic 
decisions they make about their choice of primary school (which may include decisions about 
whether they want their child to attend a faith school)14.  
                                                
12 The CPI is defined as the percentage of children under 16 in an electoral ward living in families that were, in 
1998, receiving at least one of the following benefits: Income Support; Jobseekers Allowance; Family Credit; 
Disability Working Allowance, and is therefore a proxy for neighbourhood deprivation. 
13 ‘High’ is defined as above 30% of the ward. Proportions are based on the 1991 national census. 
14 In wave 1 22% of our sample are Church of England, 8.5% are Roman Catholic and 10.3% are another 
Christian denomination. Of those in our final sample, 5.69% change faith between wave 1 and wave 3 of the 
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Parents were asked to give details of all schools they nominated on the LA form, and any 
other schools they applied to. The survey also asks the parent to name any schools that they 
would have liked their child to attend “but chose not to apply to”. We take the parents’ most 
preferred school as the choice they ranked highest on their LA application form. Around 7% 
of parents say they would have preferred their child to attend a different school but they 
chose not to apply15. For these parents we replace their most preferred school on the LA form 
with this hidden preference. The dataset also provides extensive information on the reasons 
that parents gave for their choice of school; we analyse this in a companion paper (Burgess et 
al 2009). 
 
There are two potential problems with this data. First, it is clear from the chronology that 
parents are asked the survey questions retrospectively, on average about 12 months after they 
would have made their choices. There is therefore a possibility that parents do not recall their 
nominations accurately. Parents that do not get their first choice may forget that they initially 
made a different choice, or may have rationalised their actual school as a good choice. If this 
were the case, we would expect a higher fraction of parents in our data stating that their 
actual school is their first choice school. We believe our data is broadly comparable to the 
national picture, however16.  Also, any bias would be enhanced if it was more likely to 
happen for a particular parent type. In fact, in our companion paper we find that on average 
parents of different social class are equally likely to be admitted to their first choice school. 
We therefore believe that recall bias is not a serious problem.    
 
Secondly, there is a discrepancy between the percentage of parents saying that they gave a 
preference on the LA form, and the national picture. 28% of our sample report that they made 
no application through the LA application form. LAs that we contacted reported that at least 
95% of parents did express a preference in this way however, as application forms were 
compulsory. The difference between the survey and actual response rate could be because 
parents have forgotten what they did, did not recognise the questionnaire wording as a 
description of what they did, were confused by the system of application, or simply did not 
want to answer the question in full. The questionnaire routing and wording is given in 
                                                                                                                                                  
survey. Around half of the people that change faith now have an affinity with the Church of England, which 
could be related to the high performance of these religious schools. Strategic changes of faith by parents are 
often reported in the media. Also see Allen and West (forthcoming). 
15 The most common reasons parents gave for not applying to this ‘hidden preference’ or most preferred school 
was because it was too far away or they were doubtful their child would get in. Other reasons given by a 
minority of parents are school expenses and religious grounds. 
16 Our data shows that 94.2% of parents got their first choice school. There is no national data for primary 
schools on the percentage of families getting first choice. We contacted a small number of LAs and all reported 
at least 90%. There is national data for secondary schools, in which 83.2% of applicants get their first choice 
school, but we expect this number to be below that for primary school places.  
  
16 
Appendix 3. There is a mild socio-economic gradient in answers to this point: 31.90% of 
parents in the lowest SES quintile say that they made no application, compared to 26.43% of 
those in the highest SES quintile.   
 
We use data from the MCS for England only in order to match to the National Pupil Database 
(NPD), see below, yielding some 9000 families. The biggest source of missing data is the 
families not reporting their first choice of school, reducing the sample size by some 2000 
families. We drop 12 pupils who attend special schools, as it is likely that parents’ 
preferences might be non-standard in this case17. For practical purposes, we retain pupils with 
more than two feasible schools. This yields a sample of 6,756; once we take into account 
further missing data for the regressions, we end up with 4218 in the estimation.  
 
b. Schools data 
 
Detailed information on schools is essential to compare characteristics of the chosen school 
with others that were feasible choices. We create the dataset for this purpose by combining 
variables from two administrative data sources: EduBase and the NPD.  
 
EduBase holds administrative information for all educational establishments (state and 
independent) in England and Wales, maintained by the Department for Children, Schools and 
Families (DCSF). Administrative information includes the type of school (whether voluntary 
aided, voluntary controlled etc.), phase of education (primary, middle or secondary) and its 
exact location (postcode). We keep all non-special schools in England: this means that special 
schools do not appear in a pupil’s feasible choice set. We drop all primary schools which do 
not admit pupils at 4 or 5 years old, as these schools are unavailable to our sample of parents.  
 
The NPD is an administrative dataset owned by DCSF which contains information on pupils’ 
attainment throughout their school careers, and also information from the pupil level census 
such as each pupil’s eligibility for free school meals, recognition of any special educational 
need and whether they have English as an additional language. Providing this information for 
the census (previously known as PLASC, now the Annual Schools Census) is a statutory 
requirement for all maintained schools in England; data should therefore be accurate and 
reliable. We collapse the pupil level data to school level, yielding the percentage of pupils in 
the school that are eligible for free school meals and so on. From the attainment data, we 
construct a measure of each school’s average exam18 points score (averaged over 3 years; 
                                                
17 Note that we do not drop all pupils who have some level of emotional or behavioural difficulty. 
18 These are the Key stage 2 exams, compulsory for all pupils in state schools in English, maths and science. 
These exams are nationally set and remotely marked. They are (because of their publication) high-stakes for the 
schools but not for the students (they do not affect school assignment). 
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2003, 2004 and 2005), and the percentage of high-achieving pupils19. This indicator is taken 
from pupils taking the tests in 2003, which were published in school performance tables20 in 
2004 when parents were making their school choices. We adopt this measure as it is readily 
observable to parents – these performance tables are widely published and reported in the 
national and local media. However, it is clearly not a measure of school effectiveness as it 
incorporates the effect of school composition as well as teaching quality. An alternative 
would be to for us to compute an estimate of value-added as the school quality attribute; this 
would better represent school effectiveness but would be very difficult for parents to observe 
and use to make their choices. 
 
There are two issues we must account for in the schools data. First, we must impute academic 
information for schools in 5,344 out of 22,324 cases21. Second, independent schools raise a 
number of problems. Choosing a fee-paying school is another branch of decision-making. In 
terms of data, most of the school-level information for independent schools is not available, 
excluding them from the model. Independent schools are not covered by the schools census, 
and many do not sit the Key stage 2 exams that our attainment data are based on. Our survey 
results show that 4.54% of pupils in our sample attend an independent school, compared to 
around 5% nationally22. We find that only 89 parents (under 1% of the sample) applied to the 
LA for state education if they currently attend a fee-paying school. We drop families where 
the child attends an independent school from our sample, and we do not include such schools 
in the choice set for parents. We report more on this issue in Appendix 4.  
 
c. Spatial data: Generating feasible school choice sets 
 
The final key element in our data is to link the families to the schools that they could have 
chosen; that is, to define their feasible choice set (FCS) of schools. The choice set that a 
family considers cannot be known, so we have to attempt to recreate it. There are no legal 
                                                
19 Level 5 is above the expected level of attainment at KS2. This indicator therefore represents the proportion of 
pupils that achieve highly at the end of primary school in all subjects.  
20 School performance tables are available online each year from the Department of Children Schools and 
Families (DCSF), for example see: http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/performancetables/primary_08.shtml, where a 
variety of statistics on school performance are published.  
21 Many schools in the 4 – 11 age range are administratively split into infant schools (ages 4 – 7) and junior 
schools (up to age 11). These split schools are typically closely linked (for example, on the same site), but this is 
not noted in the administrative data and so has to be recreated statistically. This is necessary to attach the 
appropriate age 11 attainment data to the age 4 or 5 entry choice. We impute KS2 scores for each infant school 
based on the schools’ characteristics. We also impute KS2 scores for schools missing academic information for 
other reasons. We impute KS2 mean scores for 3,846 out of 22,324 primary schools and the proportion with 
level 5 in all KS2 tests in 2003 for 5,344. Another feasible method, however, would use scores from the junior 
school that most pupils in an infant school attend. Following recent work at CMPO, we explore this method by 
matching infant schools with their modal junior school. We compare attainment in both method and find a high 
degree of correlation. 
22 From the authors own calculations, based on the Independent Schools Council Census 2009 
http://www.isc.co.uk/publication_8_0_0_11_561.htm, and the Annual Schools Census for Spring 2008. 
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restrictions on the schools that a family can apply to, as noted in the previous section. In 
principle, therefore, the feasible set of schools could be very large indeed. In the year our 
cohort applied for school places parents could apply to any school inside or outside their LA, 
though making an application to a school outside their own LA was more difficult23. We take 
two approaches to define a FCS, one based on distance alone, and one based on consideration 
of each school’s “catchment area”. 
 
FCS-T represents the choice set of schools that is feasible in terms of distance to travel. We 
calculate the straight line distance between each pupil in our sample and every school in 
England. We assign all schools that are within 3km of the pupil’s home and in the same LA 
to their feasible choice set. The FCS-T simply defines what is available within reasonable 
travel distance of the family’s home; it captures nothing about whether the family might 
reasonably be expected to be offered a place there. Our preferred feasible choice set which 
accounts for restrictions that parents may face is detailed below.  
 
As noted in the previous section, proximity to the school is often the key tie-breaker in 
determining admission to over-subscribed schools. The English system has historically used 
proximity as a determinant of whether a pupil can be admitted to a school. The expansion of 
school choice limited the importance of proximity to some extent, but distance remains a 
prominent over-subscription criterion in the School Admissions Code, and proximity is very 
widely included in admissions procedures.24  
 
We define a narrower, constrained FCS to capture this likelihood of not being offered a place, 
FCS-C. To implement this, we use the census data to construct a measure of each school’s de 
facto catchment area, the area within which prospective pupils are very likely to be admitted 
to the school25. The process is as follows: 
1) We calculate the straight-line distance between the home address and school attended 
for all pupils in England in the reception year group in 200426. This is some half 
million pupils. This tells us how far pupils travel to attend each school.  
2) We then collate that by school and calculate the 80th percentile of the distribution of 
distances for each school. We take 80% to exclude outliers. Thus 80% of pupils 
                                                
23 In most cases parents must contact the relevant local authority (LA) and submit a separate application form. 
Pupils in London submitted a common application form for all LAs, however. The Pan-London co-ordinated 
admissions system was introduced from 2005 (the year after our cohort applied to primary school). The aim of 
this scheme was to co-ordinated admissions between all LAs in London and some surrounding LAs to reduce 
the number of parents receiving multiple offers, and those receiving none. Nominated schools were all on the 
same application form regardless of their LA, which also made the process easier for parents. 
24 See Annex A of West et. al. (2009). 
25 Some local authorities may have official catchment areas for some schools which are non-linear. Official 
catchment areas in rural areas may exclude one village and include another for example. Our approach does not 
take account of this, but we believe it to be a good approximation. 
26 This is the entry cohort in the year before the MCS cohort entered primary school. 
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attending school S live no further away from the school than that distance. We assume 
that any family contemplating choosing school S and living no further away than that 
distance, would feel almost certain of being offered a place at that school on 
proximity grounds. That school choice could be considered a “safe” option.  
 
The calculation is based on the previous year’s entry as this is the year that is most relevant to 
prospective parents in our sample27.  
 
This sort of information is very likely to be known by parents. Most LAs provide information 
on the number of applications for entry and the number of places possible to be allocated in 
the previous year, which gives an indication of relative supply and demand. This is presented 
alongside other school information in the LA application booklet and so is easily accessible. 
Some LAs also give further information on oversubscribed schools, for example how far 
away the furthest pupil lived from the school in the previous year.  
 
Under this second approach, each family’s FCS-C consists of schools for which they live 
within the 80th percentile of the distance distribution, which are in the LA they live in and are 
within 20km of the family home28. Since the de facto catchment area approach is meant to 
identify a minimal set of almost–sure schools, it is to be expected that many families will 
succeed in an application outside this set. In our sample 27.5% make a choice outside the 
schools whose de facto catchment areas they are in. So to complete the FCS-C, we add to this 
set all schools named on the LA application form and any other schools applied to. 
 
Distance is likely to be an important variable in parents’ decision making. We therefore need 
a measure of distance between each family and each school in its FCS-T and FCS-C. 
Calculating the distance per se is part of the procedure outlined above, but confidentiality 
requirements mean that we cannot retain actual distances for the analysis. We therefore 
transform the distance variable to the distance rank of schools: whether each school in the 
feasible choice set is the closest, second closest, third closest and so on.  
 
Finally we map the information regarding each LA’s assignment mechanism (either EP or 
FPF) on to the survey data29.  
 
 
                                                
27 In fact the correlation between years is quite strong. The same calculation in the previous year group has a 
correlation with the current year group of 0.76. 
28 This final restriction is simply to ensure that schools with very large catchment areas, such as boarding 
schools, are excluded from the feasible choice set. 
29 Having done this, we anonymise the local authority variable so we cannot identify pupils’ region of the 
country. 
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d. Defining groups of schools  
 
To implement the econometric model we need to group schools. Our criteria are as follows: 
the within group variance in school characteristics should be smaller than the between group 
variance; schools in the same groups should be seen by the parent as similar, while schools in 
different groups should have quite different characteristics. The process ensures school 
groups are “distinct in the eyes of the decision maker” (McFadden, 1973).  
 
All groups are defined relative to each family’s feasible choice set. This means that although 
actual schools are different for each family, each family will have a group of “relatively 
highly performing” schools and a group of not so highly performing schools. We define a 
“high-scoring” school as a school with average KS2 exam performance over 3 years that is 
greater than the median level within the FCS. A “low scoring” school is therefore a school 
with an average KS2 score below the median. When schools are equal to the median value 
we randomly assign them either above or below. We define a “relatively poor” school as a 
school where the proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals (FSM) is above the 
median level within the FCS and a “relatively rich” school as a school where the proportion is 
below the median. Again, in cases where the school equals the median it is randomly 
assigned. We also distinguish between faith and non-faith schools. We group schools based 
on relative levels of KS2 and FSM within each FCS and on their faith status. This provides 
the groups given in table 5, for example “rich, low scoring non-faith” schools, “rich, high 
scoring non-faith” schools, and “rich, high scoring faith” schools. Table 5 shows that 79.08% 
of parents have a poor, low scoring non-faith school in their feasible choice set, and that 
75.47% have a rich, high scoring faith school. Only 56.86% have a rich, high scoring non-
faith school, however, and 35.69% have a poor, low scoring non-faith school. Faith schools 
are most likely to be above average in terms of KS2 score and below average in their 
proportion of pupils with FSM; only 45.19% have a poor, low scoring faith school, and 
27.78% have a poor, high scoring faith school.  
 
School characteristics are averaged to the group level, with the exception of distance rank. 
For this variable we take the minimum rank of the group; all else equal we expect a closer 
school to be preferred. All school characteristics (before they are collapsed to group level) are 
presented in table 3.  
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4. Results 
 
 
We first characterise the feasible choice sets that we have constructed, and the school groups. 
We then set out the main estimation results, followed by a series of robustness checks.  We 
finally carry out a number of exercises to quantify the effects in interpretable ways.  
 
a. Characterising the feasible choice sets 
 
All pupils with at least two schools available in their FCS-C are included in the model. Table 
1 shows the considerable variation in the number of schools available in the population of 
pupils that have at least two schools in their FCS-C: 8.38% of pupils have two schools 
available, and 17.03% have 5, and 3.33% have more than 11. The number of schools 
available depends on population density as there are more schools in urban areas. Given our 
definition of catchment areas for schools it also depends on the relative popularity of some 
schools in your area as these may be excluded from your feasible choice set. The comparison 
of the number of schools available between FCS-C and FSC-T in Table 1 shows that 
catchment areas for schools greatly restrict the numbers of schools available to parents. By 
ignoring this constraint we would overestimate the ‘choice’ available to parents. When we 
focus on school groups, we see that less than one percent of pupils have all school groups in 
their feasible choice set, while the modal number is 4. Pupils are more likely to have less than 
4 school groups available than they are to have more than 4. 
 
Table 3 shows that there are clear differences in the quality of schools available for different 
types of parent. On average schools available to parents have 16% of pupils with FSM. This 
is 22% for parents in the lowest SES quintile however, and only 11% for parents in the 
highest SES quintile. Schools available to the population as a whole have 19% of pupils 
achieving a high standard in their KS2 tests, compared to 17% in schools available to parents 
in the lowest SES quintile and 23% for parents in the highest SES quintile. Similar variations 
in the characteristics of schools exist between those with no education and those with at least 
a degree. While schools in metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas have different 
proportions of pupils with FSM, EAL, and that are white, academic performance is the same 
on average, as is the level of SEN. These are important differences to account for in our 
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model, and this is the motivation for defining school groups relative to the specific feasible 
choice set. 
 
Despite large differences in absolute levels of school characteristics, table 4 shows that on 
average all types of parents have a large degree of choice in their feasible choice set. The 
standard deviation for the proportion of pupils with FSM is 0.08 (or 8 percentage points) for 
the whole population. Those in the lowest socio-economic quintile have a larger variance in 
school characteristics than those in the highest SES quintile; 0.11 compared to 0.06 in FSM 
for example. The same is true for those with no education compared to those with at least a 
degree, and for those in metropolitan areas compared with those in non-metropolitan areas. 
This suggests that within their feasible set of schools, parents have some degree of choice in 
the characteristics of the school they apply to. Parents could feasibly apply to a high scoring 
school with a low proportion of pupils with FSM or a low scoring school with a high 
proportion of pupils with FSM (defined relative to their local area). We argue that the 
availability of this choice to most parents can enable us to genuinely elicit parents’ revealed 
preferences. 
 
 
b. Estimation results 
 
 
Having described the different choice sets available to different families, we now turn to the 
main task of modelling the choices made. We first discuss the results of the regression 
estimating the conditional logit model from (4) for all LAs, presented in Table 8. Second, we 
discuss the preferred results focussing on LAs using the ‘Equal Preferences’ assignment 
mechanism, presented in Table 9.   
 
The top panel of Table 8 displays the school group-specific variables which are school-group 
invariant. The middle panel presents the family-specific variables in rows. As family-specific 
variables vary across school-groups, the school-group-specific coefficients for each school-
group are presented in the columns. We present only a subset of the coefficients in the table; 
other variables included in the model are listed in the footnote to the table and the full results 
are available from the authors. The final panel presents some diagnostic statistics for the 
model.  
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The top panel shows that the school characteristics that parents most care about are: distance 
rank, negatively valued; academic achievement, positively valued; and school socio-
economic composition (the fraction of children from poor families), negatively valued. We 
postpone discussion of the quantitative significance of these coefficients. The results show 
that families do not value a school by its proportion of pupils with English as an additional 
language, or the proportion of pupils with special needs. The ethnic composition is also 
insignificant.  
 
Each column represents a school-group. In each column, the coefficients in the middle panel 
are interpreted as the impact of a variable on the likelihood of choosing a school in the given 
school-group relative to a school in the omitted group (the “poor, low-scoring, non-faith” 
school-group). The pattern of the socio-economic status coefficients suggests little difference 
in choosing faith and non-faith school-groups. It also suggests that richer families are more 
likely to choose a school in the higher-scoring school-group over the omitted group than the 
poorest fifth of families. The overall pattern is summarised in Figure 2: high socio-economic 
status families are more likely to choose schools in the “rich, high-scoring, non-faith” group 
and less likely to choose schools in the “poor, low-scoring, non-faith” group and, in the top 
two quintiles, marginally less likely to choose “poor, high-scoring, non-faith” schools. 
Statistically, the strongest effects are for the 2nd and 3rd quintiles being much more likely to 
choose “poor, high-scoring” schools over “poor, low-scoring” schools than the lowest 
quintile. Overall, the p-value for the joint significance of socio-economic status is 2.88%.  
 
Parents with at least a degree or ‘A’ level30 qualification are more likely to choose the “rich, 
high-scoring, non-faith” school-group compared to the reference school-group, although 
these are the only significant coefficients for parental education variables. Neighbourhood 
deprivation also has a small impact, which suggests we are successfully controlling for 
neighbourhood constraints parents may face in their school choice31. Self-reported faith has 
the strongest effect of the other included parental variables included in the model. Recall that 
this is taken from the first wave of the survey, possibly before any incentive for ‘strategic’ 
motives for a change in faith. Self-reported faith has a significant impact on the probability of 
                                                
30 ‘A level’ exams are generally taken after two years study after the end of compulsory schooling at age 16. 
There is a minimum requirement of 5 GSCE grades at A*-C for progression onto A level courses.  
31 This is strengthened by the fact that IMD variables remain largely insignificant in the model even when 
distance rank is not controlled for. This shows that the catchment area restrictions we account for are effective.  
When the same test is tried for the FCS-T IMD coefficients are highly significant, which suggests that in a 
broader definition of FCS location has a significant impact on parents’ choice of school. 
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choosing a faith school-group relative to the reference school-group.  There is a much greater 
likelihood of choosing a school in the richer faith school-groups rather than the poorer 
schools, however, suggesting that parents also value composition of the school as well as its 
denomination. 
 
 
School group 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 
Faith? N N N Y Y Y Y 
Composition? 
Non-
poor 
Non-
poor Poor 
Non-
poor 
Non-
poor Poor Poor 
Attainment? L H H L H L H 
Church of England -0.178 0.295* 0.111 0.671* 0.589*** 0.375 0.387 
 0.89 2.1 0.59 2.4 3.78 1.72 1.3 
Roman Catholic -0.68 -0.064 -0.057 1.539*** 2.289*** 1.372*** 1.775*** 
 1.86 0.26 0.18 4.3 11.65 4.87 4.82 
Note: Coefficients from the analysis in Table 8.  
 
Other variables included in the model are ethnicity of the main parent, measures of parental 
interaction with the child (frequency of reading and visits away from home), availability of a 
car, demographics (birth order and number of siblings, gender and season of birth), and 
measures of the emotional and cognitive development of the child. There are few significant 
differences between White parents and parents of other ethnic groups, although families of 
Black African heritage are more likely to choose high-scoring and faith school-groups. 
Families reporting a high frequency of reading and many visits away from the home, 
variables that also measure socio-economic background, are more likely to choose the rich, 
high-scoring non-faith school group. There are no strong, systematic patterns in the effect of 
the other variables.   
 
The model includes a binary variable for whether the parent expressed a preference for a 
school that was further than 3km from their home. This captures a willingness to travel with 
the child. The model shows that parents who applied to a school far from their home are more 
likely to apply to almost all types of school-group (except the rich, low-scoring non-faith 
school-group). This suggests that parents are willing to travel for high academic standards 
and a religious affiliation of the school, and in part is picking up the larger catchment areas of 
faith schools more generally.  
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The final panel of the table gives McFadden’s R2 of 0.224. We also calculate that the number 
of correct predictions of group choice from the model is 72%. This seems a reasonably 
creditable performance and suggests that the model is capturing a good deal of the underlying 
behaviour.  We report a number of tests of joint significance including socio-economic status 
(p-value of 2.88%), self-reported faith (0%), other parental characteristics (0.42%), child 
characteristics (4.66%) and neighbourhood deprivation (0.11%).  It is reassuring to note that 
both the school-specific variables and the family-specific variables are significant: both parts 
of the model are important explanators. Unsurprisingly given the strong similarity of our 
defined school groups, the Hausman test for the IIA property fails. One standard response to 
the failure of the IIA is to consider a nested logit approach. For some families this would 
make sense: they may first want a faith school of any type, followed by high test scores. 
Other families may want high test scores above all else, and so on. But because there is no 
natural order for the nesting, we cannot implement this and stick with the conditional logit 
approach.  
 
In Table 9 we repeat the analysis including only LAs using the EP pupil assignment 
mechanism in the sample. As noted in the methodology the EP assignment rule is expected to 
elicit parents’ true preferences in their school nominations. The number of observations falls 
from 4218 to 2479; these LAs account for 58.8% of the sample. Comparing these results to 
those for all LAs in the previous table we see that the school-specific coefficients change a 
little: the school composition variable is a little less negative and the academic attainment a 
little more positive, perhaps suggesting that under the EP system parents are more likely to 
nominate a desirable, “most truly preferred” school, i.e. a higher achieving school. The 
distance rank coefficient is almost identical, suggesting it is more likely to be schools’ 
catchment areas rather than distance which constrain choice. The pattern of coefficients on 
the family-specific variables changes only marginally; the socio-economic status and parental 
education coefficients that were remain significant and become a little larger in magnitude.  
 
It is unsurprising that results are similar to our main results as almost two thirds of the 
samples are the same. We would like to compare coefficients between samples in EP with 
FPF LAs but the smaller size of the latter sample coupled with a quite demanding estimation 
prohibits this.  
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c. Robustness results 
 
 
We illustrate the importance of using FCS-C as the feasible choice set in our main regression 
by comparing the results with those under FCS-T. This also serves to underline the value of 
our data which includes the spatial element of the de facto catchment areas. Table 10 presents 
the same model as Table 8, but in this case using FCS-T. 
 
There are a number of striking changes. First, note that this model does a much worse job of 
explaining the data – 62% correct predictions as opposed to 72%; McFadden’s R2 is about 
20% lower. Second, the school group-specific variables are different: the coefficient on 
academic attainment has halved in value and become insignificant, while the coefficient on 
composition has increased substantially. Our interpretation of this is that FCS-T does not 
accurately capture the true choice set, particularly for poorer families. Although high-scoring 
schools are feasible in terms of distance they may not necessarily be feasible after 
consideration of the schools’ catchment area, so schools in FSC-T are likely to be higher 
scoring on average. In this case the model will compare the school chosen to these high 
scoring schools, even when in practice they are an unrealistic choice. This may also explain 
why the coefficient for FSM increases; schools in FCS-T are likely to have a larger variance 
in composition than those in FCS-C. If FCS-C excludes more deprived schools, then it will 
seem as though parents more actively avoid these types of school. Third, differences in 
preferences between socio-economic groups appear much stronger when constraints are not 
appropriately accounted for: the p-value for socio-economic status falls to 0.01% from 
2.88%. The neighbourhood-specific variables are also more important: the p-value on local 
deprivation is 0.04% versus 0.11% above.  Distance rank still plays an important role in 
controlling for the choices actually available to parents. In fact, neighbourhood characteristics 
are strongly significant if we exclude distance rank from the model. This is not the case in 
FCS-C, suggesting that this definition of FCS is appropriate.  
 
We perform a number of other robustness checks on the model: we rerun the model using 
only those children whose parents that have not moved house since the child in the survey 
was born; those children without an older sibling of primary school age; and those in 
metropolitan areas. These subsequent analyses use FCS-C and we do not restrict the sample 
to LAs operating under EP in 2004/5 (the latter is simply to maintain the sample size).  
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We run the first robustness check as residential location at the date we observe is not 
exogenous. This is particularly true given the importance attached to location for school 
access, though this is more often emphasised for secondary schools than the primary stage 
studied here. To address this problem we exploit the rich longitudinal nature of the MCS 
which asks parents in each wave of the survey whether they have moved address since the 
previous survey. We restrict the sample to include only those families who did not report 
moving house since the birth of the cohort child, which leaves 2230 observations. The results 
are in Table 11. Note that to ensure convergence of the model we re-group all faith schools 
into two groups: a rich, high-scoring faith school-group (as before) and an “other faith” 
school-group. Relative to the original results in table 8, the school composition variable 
increases in absolute value by 8.3%, the academic attainment variable by 73%, and distance 
rank by 15.8%. Socio-economic status is less important (joint significance p-value of 29.6% 
and very few individually significant coefficients) as are parental characteristics (p-value of 
13.8%) and neighbourhood controls (3.6%). Note that this may be partly due to the lower 
sample size. This suggests that when we focus on a sample where location is much more 
likely to be exogenous, we find that school characteristics have a stronger impact on parents’ 
preferences for school but socio-economic differences are less prominent.  This suggests that 
high socio-economic status families who move house drive some of the differences in 
preferences for school.  
 
We run the second robustness check as most admissions authorities give preference to 
prospective pupils with siblings already at the school. By restricting the sample to those 
children with no older sibling of primary school age we focus only on families where the 
preference given on the LA form has no relation to other siblings. The results are in Table 12, 
with a sample of 1851 families. Again, socio-economic characteristics are less important than 
the base case (p-value of 8.90%), parental characteristics (41.60%) and neighbourhoods 
(5.23%) likewise. The school group-specific coefficients are less changed than under the non-
movers: the coefficient on school composition is absolutely larger by 37.3 %, distance rank 
increases by 5.5%, but academic attainment falls in magnitude by 10.4%.  
 
Overall, we argue that the main points of our estimation results are strengthened by 
considering these sub-samples in which endogeneity is less likely to be a problem. Whilst it 
would be useful to cut to the sample to those in households with no older sibling of primary 
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school age and that have not moved house in the period we observe, unfortunately this leaves 
too few observations for the model to converge. 
 
We next consider restricting the sample to only families living in metropolitan areas, which 
leaves a sample of 1661. We expect school choice to be more practical in metropolitan areas; 
it is possible to travel to a larger number of schools, and there is a larger variation in schools’ 
characteristics. Again, note that to ensure convergence of the model we re-group all faith 
schools into two groups: a rich, high-scoring faith school-group (as before) and an “other 
faith” school-group. Results show, as might be expected, that distance rank is less important 
in metropolitan areas32. School academic attainment becomes substantially more important, 
increasing by 88.9% and becoming very well determined; school composition falls in 
absolute terms by 24.8% and is less well estimated. Focusing on parental variables, socio-
economic status and other parental variables are less statistically important compared to the 
main results, but self-reported faith remains as important.  
 
Another issue to address is whether our FCS definitions capture the true choices open to 
families. If not, then our estimated ‘preferences’ will still contain elements of their 
constraints. The obvious main concern here is the extent to which poor families have a 
preference for local high-poverty schools, or in fact only have access to such schools. That is, 
whether it reflects an area effect, or a true preference. This question is partly answered by our 
discussion of the nature of the FCS-C sets above, and partly by these results in table 10.  
 
 
 
d. Quantifying the effects 
 
 
We address the question of quantifying parental preferences more directly by estimating the 
trade-offs between school characteristics. For example, how much higher would academic 
performance need to be to make the family indifferent to an increase of one in the distance 
rank? How much closer would a school have to be to compensate for a one standard deviation 
increase in its proportion of ‘poor’ students? We also allow these trade-offs to differ by 
                                                
32 Separate calculations show that the mean distance between the first and second closest school is 154m in 
Tower Hamlets for example, compared with almost 2km in North Yorkshire. 
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family characteristic, thus directly addressing whether different families have different 
preferences. We set this up as follows. 
 
A family is indifferent between two schools in groups 2 and 1 if the probability of choosing 
each school group is the same, that is P(Yi2 = 1) = P(Yi3 = 1).  Expanding this with the 
conditional logit model given in (4) gives: 
 
      (5) 
 
In this case we explicitly focus on the probability of choosing a school in school-group 2 and 
school-group 1 and have used subscripts accordingly. We have also explicitly noted the 
group-specific coefficients (γ2 and γ 1) on the family-specific variables ( ), and noted the 
group-specific constants. This is important because our groups are defined on school 
characteristics. Therefore a change in a school characteristic may switch its group.  
Manipulating this equation, it is straightforward to reach:  
 
       (6) 
 
As and are vectors of characteristics we expand this as: 
 
 
 
Where there are k school characteristics and j family level characteristics. The first term is the 
difference of all school-group characteristics between group 2 and 1 for each family. The 
second term is the difference in the constant terms between school-group 2 and school-group 
1. The third term is the difference in coefficients between group 2 and group 1 for each 
family level characteristic, for each family.  
 
Suppose we are interested in two school group characteristics  and , whose values push 
schools into groups 2 and 1.   Define: 
 ,  
, and  
. 
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If we are interested in school characteristics 1 and k, the trade-off is given as follows: 
 
  
 
 
The calculation for the trade-off between school characteristics x1 and xk between the two 
school-groups is: 
 
       (7) 
 
This has two parts. The second component comes from the part of the school-
specific variables part of the model. This is common across all families. It is also the value of 
the trade-off if the comparison is within a group rather than between groups. The first 
component allows this trade-off to vary by family, depending on the γ coefficients and the 
constants.  
 
Note that if the change in and do not push the schools into different groups then Δcon = 
0 and ΔγWi = 0, leaving only the trade-off . In this case the trade-off does not vary 
by , and becomes the standard way of describing the trade-offs (see Davies et al (2001)).  
 
The table below shows the core trade-off term in column one, where all coefficients 
used in the calculation are taken from the main results in Table 8 (all LAs). The trade-off 
between non-poor non-faith school-groups are given in column two, and the trade-off 
between poor non-faith school-groups in column three. Columns 1 and 2 use equation (7) to 
construct the trade-off between academic standards and distance rank (row 1) and school 
composition and distance rank (row 2). 
 
Trade-off between: Core Non-poor 
schools 
Poor schools 
Academic attainment and distance 
rank 
0.23 0.24 0.24 
    
Trade-off between: Core High-
scoring 
schools 
Low- 
scoring 
schools 
School composition (% FSM) and -0.13 -0.13 -0.16 
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distance rank 
 
 
The interpretation is as follows. Using the core measure, if a school is now one school 
(distance rank) further away, families would on average need an increase of 23 percentage 
points in the academic attainment measure at this school to remain indifferent between 
choosing this school and another. This is equivalent to about 2 standard deviations of the 
academic attainment measure; a substantial effect. Turning to the second row, again for a 
school one rank further away, families would indifferent between nominating that school if 
its fraction of poor students was 13 percentage points lower, using the core measure. The 
standard deviation of the FSM percentage is 0.15. These seem sensible orders of magnitude. 
These numbers represent the answers to the questions we began with, attempting to identify 
the preferences of families for school characteristics.  
 
We are forced to use distance rank rather than actual distance because of confidentiality 
issues in the MCS. We can use the administrative data in the NPD to get a sense of the 
average scale of one distance rank in terms of kilometres, however. To do this we use all 
pupils in the NPD that began primary school (around half a million) in the year before our 
cohort. Using a similar process to that defined in the data section to create FCS-T we identify 
each pupil’s nearest school, second nearest school and so on. We then compute the average 
distance between first and second ranked school, second and third, and so on. The details of 
this exercise are available from the authors. It shows that on average33, one distance rank is 
about 800m.  Thus, a typical family trades off an extra 400 metres to school for a rise in 
standards of one standard deviation, 11 percentage points.  
 
We can use the methodology to compute the preference trade-off directly between academic 
attainment and school composition. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of low 
income students at a school is off-set by a 1.722 percentage point increase in the attainment 
measure. A school with a high intake of low income children can attract other families if it 
performs very well academically. And given that on average such children tend to under-
                                                
33 The mean difference between first nearest and second is 812.5m; between second and third closest schools is 
667.9m. The average difference between the four closest schools for each pupil is 611m. This varies 
substantially across the country however; pupils in Cornwall travel an extra 1977m to their second closest 
school, while pupils in Camden travel only an extra 89m on average. 
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perform relative to their better-off peers, the school’s educational effort has to more than 
offset this factor to be as equally attractive.  
 
Another goal of the paper is to investigate whether different families have different 
preferences. Table 14 presents the trade-offs made between academic standards and distance 
rank between rich, high scoring non-faith schools and rich, low scoring non-faith schools for 
families of varying levels of SES. Table 15 presents trade-offs made between the same school 
characteristics between high and low scoring poor schools. Both tables show that on average 
those in the lowest SES quintile have a stronger trade-off between academic standards and 
distance rank than those in the highest SES quintile. Between rich schools for example, those 
in the lowest SES quintile require a 24 percentage point increase in academic standards to 
compensate for an increase of one distance rank. Those in the highest SES quintile require a 
20 percentage point increase, however, which is marginally smaller. These calculations were 
computed for each member of the sample, and the distribution of the calculation is therefore 
informative of its precision. The standard deviation and inter-quartile range of the trade-off 
calculation is large in each case, suggesting that differences between trade-offs between 
parents of high and low SES are not significantly different. In theory it would be possible to 
calculate the standard error of these estimates which would provide definitive evidence on 
whether differences are significant. This computation would involve all coefficients in the 
model, however, many of which are not significant.  
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 
We have combined survey, administrative, census and spatial data to study parental 
preferences for schools in England. One of the central challenges has been to distinguish 
between constraints, that is, what is available to be chosen from, and preferences. We have 
used the census and spatial data to define and construct empirical feasible choice sets for each 
survey member. These illustrate stark differences in the options available to families at 
different ends of the socio-economic spectrum.  
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Our results add to the literature in a number of ways. We show that the main characteristics 
that parents care about in a school are academic attainment, school socio-economic 
composition and travel distance. This is probably not a surprise34. However, we are able to 
quantify this and also be reasonably confident that we have identified preferences not 
constraints. Using the results, we estimate the trade-offs parents are willing to make between 
distance and attainment, and between distance and composition. We also show that on 
average, families do not appear to care so much about ethnic composition35, or proportions of 
children with special educational needs.  
 
Preferences are heterogeneous between families; those in the lowest SES quintile require a 24 
percentage point increase in academic standards to compensate for an increase of one 
distance rank, while those in the highest SES quintile require a 20 percentage point increase. 
However, we show that the distribution of preferences does not vary greatly between 
different socio-economic groups; in fact, the distribution of preferences of the rich and poor 
almost completely overlap. It may be that what families want is for their child to go to a 
school with other children “like” their own. This could mean many things, but it might mean 
“like” in terms of socio-economic status. If that were true then we might expect low socio-
economic status families to prefer schools with high percentages of poor children and higher 
status families to prefer schools with lower such percentages. This would obviously 
encourage greater social stratification in schools. There are small hints of this: the mean 
trade-off of distance and composition is slightly lower for the poor, and at the very lower end 
the trade-off switches sign. But inspecting the results in tables 14 to 17, it is clear that the first 
order message is that preferences are very similar across parent type. 
 
Of course, there are caveats and potential reasons for concern. The main challenge in the 
analysis is the specification of the constraints in order to identify the preferences. Our 
constrained feasible choice sets are intended to capture a minimal set of schools that families 
can truly access. Potential objections to our findings include that we have got these wrong, 
and that they either still include actually infeasible schools (in a way correlated with socio-
economic status) or they exclude many feasible schools. Another central issue is the “Equal 
                                                
34 They may also care about other features, unmeasured here: sports or music facilities, uniform, and so on.  
35 The sample is not big enough to make any very strong statements about ethnic composition, and this is not the 
main focus of this study.  
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Preferences” assignment mechanism. It may be that families did not truly understand it, or 
did not respond optimally to its truth-revealing characteristic. It is interesting and perhaps 
helpful that as we compare all LAs to EP-using LAs, and as we move from all families to 
non-house-moving families, that the academic attainment characteristic of schools 
strengthens in the analysis.  
 
We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of our findings for educational 
inequality and for school choice policies more broadly. On educational inequality, we have 
shown big differences in the choice sets of different families. We have shown less important 
differences in their preferences. The big driver of differential access to better schools is the 
quality of schools nearby to where the families live, and the use of proximity as a tie-
breaking device. This relates immediately to practical issues about the operation of the 
current system.  
 
The broader implications of our results for choice in education are mixed. Parents, almost 
universally in our data, have a strong preference for schools with high academic attainment. 
This supports the idea that competition to meet those preferences should help to raise 
standards. Of course, the measure of academic attainment we have used is the raw output 
measure, as this is what parents observe, not an estimate of school effectiveness. Which 
measures schools use to increase their attainment measure is another question in the chain 
between parental preferences and school effectiveness, and it is likely that schools will both 
aim to raise effectiveness and to manipulate their intake peer group. However, the hugely 
different feasible choice sets are an illustration of the problems involved in reducing access 
inequalities. Also, confirming the importance of preferences for peer groups means that there 
is also pressure for socio-economic sorting. The challenge for education policy is to accept 
the former whilst minimising the potential for the latter.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of schools nominated on the LA form as 1st and 2nd 
 
 
Note 1, 2, … 5 refer to quintiles of the socioeconomic status variable 
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of choosing the four most common types of school, by socio‐
economic status of the main respondent 
Figure 3: Predicted probability of choosing the four most common types of school, by the 
number of visits to the library, park, zoo etc. that the child has been taken on in the past 12 
months 
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Table 1: Number of schools in FCS-T and FCS-C, the feasible choice set based on travel distance alone (FCS-T) 
and the more constrained feasible choice set (FCS-C) 
 FCS-T FCS-C 
Number of 
schools 
Percentage Cumulative 
percentage 
Percentage Cumulative 
percentage 
2 4.8 4.8 8.38 8.38 
3 5.64 10.44 16.64 25.02 
4 6.2 16.64 16.86 41.88 
5 4.91 21.55 17.03 58.91 
6 6.31 27.86 13.17 72.08 
7 5.01 32.87 10.74 82.82 
8 4.6 37.47 7.71 90.53 
9 4.66 42.13 4.06 94.59 
10 4.57 46.7 2.08 96.67 
11+ 53.3 100 3.33 100 
Note: The table shows weighted percentages. The number of schools in FCS-C is the number of schools for 
which the pupil lives within the schools' catchment area. Catchment areas are defined by the straight line 
distance in which 80% of pupils in the previous cohort lived. The number of schools in FCS-T is the number of 
schools within a 3km straight line radius of the pupil’s home. 
 
 
Table 2: Number of school-groups in FCS-T and FCS-C, the feasible choice set based on travel distance alone 
(FCS-T) and the more constrained feasible choice set (FCS-C) 
 FCS-T FCS-C 
Number of 
school-groups 
Percentage Cumulative 
percentage 
Percentage Cumulative 
percentage 
2 7.42 7.42 14.92 14.92 
3 10.99 18.41 25.95 40.87 
4 14.4 32.81 28.38 69.25 
5 25.72 58.53 19.06 88.31 
6 23.79 82.32 9.68 97.99 
7 10.89 93.21 1.82 99.81 
8 6.79 100 0.19 100 
Note: The table shows weighted percentages. The number of school-groups in FCS-C is the number of school-
groups which are constructed from each school for which the pupil lives within the schools' catchment area. 
Catchment areas are defined by the straight line distance in which 80% of pupils in the previous cohort lived. 
The number of school-groups in FCS-T is the number of school-groups constructed from all schools within a 
3km straight line radius of the pupil’s home. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
